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ltl THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
ST.'\TE 0? UT:I.H 
DELMONT GENTRY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 16090 
LAHRENCE HORRIS, l'larden, Utah 
State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
On Hay 5th, 1978, appellant, a prisoner at the 
Utah State Prison, filed a complaint for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the Third Judicial District, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of the 
Third Judicial District, conducted a hearing on August 17, 
1978. The matter was taken under advisement and both 
sides were directed to submit memorandums. On the 21st of 
September, 1978, the petition was denied with prejudice. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the denial of 
the writ of hab~as co~~us. 
STATE-lENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was found guilty of having committed 
aggravated sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping by a 
jury in the Seventh District Court in Carbon County on 
November 22, 1975. One of appellant's defenses was that he 
was asleep in his parent's home when the crime was committed. 
His alibi was supported by the testimony of his mother. 
The State's case in chief included the testimony of the 
victim and a girlfriend present throughout the incident. 
Additional rebuttal witnesses were also presented. 
On August 17, 1978, the instant matter was heard 
before the Honorable James S. Sawaya of the Third Cistrict. 
Appellant's counsel from the 1975 trial, Mr. Bryce Bryner, 
and appellant both testified. On September 21, 1978, 
appellant's petition for habeas corpus was denied, with 
prejudice. 
ARGUNENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR lvRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS \vAS PROPERLY DENIED 
SINCE ALL OF HIS CLAIMS COULD HAVE 
BEEN RAISED IN A TIMELY APPEAL. 
It is well settled in Utah that habeas corpus 
proceedings are nota substitute for appeal and may not be 
-2-
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used to invoke clai~s of error that could have been raised 
in a timely appeal. Maguire v. Smith, Utah, 547 P.2d 697 
Court noted in Brown v. Turner, 21 U.2d 96, 440 P.2d 968: 
969 (1968): 
"If the contention of error 
is something which is known or should 
be known to the party at the time the 
judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the manner and within 
the time permitted by regular pre-
scribed procedure, or the judgment 
becomes final and is not subject 
to further attack ... " 
In the instant case, none of appellant's claims 
for relief were shown to be such that they could not have 
been raised on appeal of the original conviction. No such 
appeal was ever taken. It follows that appellant should 
not be allowed to raise them now via habeas corpus petition. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR nABEAS 
CORPUS WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
SINCE THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT ABUSE APPELLANT'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN WAIVING 
THE NOTICE REQL'IREHENTS FOR 
ALIBI REBUTTAL TESTH!ONY FOR 
"GOOD CAUSE SHOWN." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-17 provides: 
"(1) .•. Not less than five 
days after receipt of defendant's 
witness list, or such other times 
as the court may direct, the 
-3-
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prosecuting attorney shull file and 
serve upon the defendant the na@c~ 
and addresses of the witnesses the 
state proposes to offer in rebuttul 
to discreJit the defendant's alibi 
i'. t t h 2 C C j_; Ll () f tJ ~ "' C ~ •.! 0 C' , 
(4) For good cause shown the 
court muy waive the requirements of 
this section." 
In Williams v. Florida,399 U.S. 78 (1970), the United 
States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of a virtually identical Florida rule. That court noted: 
"The adversary system is hardly 
an end in itself; ... we find 
ample room in that system, at least as 
far as "due process" is concerned, 
for the instant Florida rule, which 
is designed to enhance the search 
for truth in the criminal trial 
by ensuring both the defendant and 
the state ample opportunity to in-
vestigate certain facts crucial 
to the determination of guilt or 
innocence." (Id. at 82). 
That court also held, in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 u.s. 470 
(1973), that a notice-of-alibi rule which does not allow 
the defendant a reciprocal right to discover the state's 
rebuttal witnesses was void on its face as a violation of 
due process. In neither case, \·:ardius or \lilliams, hov.·ever, 
was a provision allowing the trial court to waive the 
requirements of the rule "for good cause shown" discussed. 
The court was aware that such a provision was part of the 
Florida rule held valid in Williaws (Williams, supra, 
footnote 6 at p. 80), but that portion of the rule simply 
-4-
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~~s not ~ part of the issue before the court at that time. 
Nevertheless, as t~e above-quoted portion from 
the search for truth." The rule should not be interpreted 
so strictly as to preclude the introduction of rebuttal 
evidence discovered, in good faith, after the deadline 
for notice has passed. In State v. Case, Utah, 547 P.2d 
221:223 (1976), this Court held that: 
"While we are of the opinion 
that the defense and the prosecution 
should meet the requirements of the 
statute (77-27-17), with meticulous 
care . . There is no showing that 
the prosecution intentionally 
attempted to make any concealment 
of the facts regarding the alibi or 
its refutation. We are of the 
opinion that the trial court was 
justified in waiving the requirements 
of the statute." 
In the instant case, the trial court waived the 
notice requirements and allowed alibi-rebuttal witnesses 
follm-ring a showing of good cause. The statements of the 
court at that time clearly indicated that the court was 
convinced that the prosecution was acting in good faith: 
"MR. BRYNER: Your Honor, before 
the witness answers the question I 
feel I must object on the ground that 
proper notice was not given. Although 
I have discussed this with counsel I feel 
that I must make the objection and make 
that part of the record upon the ground 
that the prosecution has not complied 
with the statute in giving timely notice 
of any evidence of this kind. 
-5-
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THE COURT: The statute you 
referred to says for qood cause shown 
the Court may waive the requirement 
of that particular statute. ~he 
C'r)U:t-L'/ _7\_~- ':0-r- ·· h -l:~ ~;f.,~;-,.;n ,;!")r.J ·~·_-,, _ _:----:; 
stalin'] to L.tlc Court in your p:..:t.:::;c=ncc-
in chambers that he only learned of 
this witness, I think he said last 
night. And did not know about this 
particular witness and what he would 
testify to with respect to this 
matter until last evening. Although 
he had made a thorough investigation 
to try to find this witness. Upon 
that showing the Court is going to 
waive the requirement of the statute 
and permit, I think good cause has 
been shown to waive it. I do waive 
it, and the witness may ans1-1er." 
(Reported Transcript of the original 
trial at page 114, also in respondent's 
Memorandum of Law in the instant matter; 
R. at 10). 
As in Case, supra, there is no showing that the prosecution 
made any attempt to conceal anything. In fact, the 
prosecution had made a "thorough investigation" in an 
attempt to find the rebuttal witnesses. Host certainly, 
a perversion of justice would have resulted were such 
newly discovered rebuttal evidence to have been excluded 
simply because it was not found until after the notice 
deadline specified in the statute had passed. The court 
acted properly in waiving the notice requirements and 
allowing the alibi-rebuttal testimony. 
-6-
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Comi110nHCCl1th v. Jackson, 457 Pa. 79, 319 r,.2d 
161 (1974) is distinguishable and is not dete:::ninative 
i~1 LI1e i~-1st....1nt ccJ.S,___;. In Jac::s.:J.t, t>1 ~ p:_~ 0 ..:;_~:::-_.-:i_-.;~~ s...:._:l;_)J...; 
refused to divulge the names of the rebuttal Hitnesses 
after compelling the defendant to give notice cf his 
alibi defense. The state's witnesses in Jackson were not, 
as in the instant case, newly discovered. 
It should also be noted that in Jackson the 
petitioner met his burden of proof in de~onstrating that he 
was harmed by the "error" in his trial. The majority in 
Jackson held: "We cannot say that this error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Id. at 16 3) . In the instant 
matter, there was no showing that appellant was substantially 
harmed by not knowing of the rebuttal witnesses any earlier 
than he did. There was substantial testimony beyond that 
of the "surprise" witnesses placing appellant away from 
his parent's home and identifying him as the perpetrator 
of the crime. If there was error in the admittance of 
the surprise testioony, unless appellant de~o~strates that 
his rights were substantially harmed, there are no grounds 
for a writ of habeas corpus. Rule 61 U.R.C.P; Rule 4, 
Utah Rules of Evidence; Alires v. Turner, 22 U.2d 118, 
449 P.2d 241:242 
417 P.2d 655:658 
82 (197 5). 
(1969); State v. Sevmour, 18 U.2d 151, 
(1966); State v. Winkle, Utah 535 P.2d 
-7-
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POINT III. 
APPELLANT'S TRIAL IN PPISON 
CLOTHitlf~ I·JAS NOT A VIOLI\.TIO'l 
OF HI:~ cn·;s'-~J'TU-LUY;_\', ~~:: 
AND \HLL NOT FOPJ'1 THE BASIS 
FOR A \'ffiiT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
The mere fact that appellant was tried in prison 
clothing and that appellant requested civilian clothing 
from his counsel do not entitle him to the relief he 
seeks. In Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. SOl (1976), a 
Texas defendant was tried for the crime of assault with 
intent to commit murder. Unable to post bond, the 
defendant remained in custody awaiting trial. When he 
learned that he was going to trial, the defendant asked an 
officer at the jail for his civilian clothes. The request 
was denied, and the defendant was tried in distinctly mark~ 
prison clothes. No objection to the clothing was raised 
at trial, and the defendant was convicted and sentenced 
to the State Prison. The defendant then sought release 
by means of a federal writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme 
Court held that: 
. the failure to make an 
objection to the Court as to being 
tried in such clothes, for whatever 
reason, is sufficient to negate 
the presence of compulsion necessary 
to establish a constitutional violation." 
[Emphasis added). 
-8-
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425 U.S. at 513. 
This court, in State v. Fair, 28 U.2d 242, 
50l P.2d 107 (1972), also concluded that in the ilbsence 
ot an obJection to the court, there is no error in trying a 
defendant clad in prison clothes. The court also noted, 
in Stilte v. Archuletta, 28 U.2d 255, 501 P.2d 263:264 
(1972), that: 
"It does not stike us that 
there would be anything strange, 
shocking, or prejudicial if the 
jury became aware that a man who 
had been arrested and charged with 
robbery was in custody and being 
held in jail." 
Appellant has not, at any time, indicated that 
any objection to his trial in prison clothing was made to 
his original trial court. Instead, based upon a mis-reading 
of Estelle, supra, he contends that he did not make a personal, 
knowing waiver and should be granted the relief he seeks. 
Clearly, there is no "right" to a trial in civilian clothes 
unless and until a formal objection is lodged with the 
trial court. Neither must there be any "waiver" of any 
sort to allow a trial in prison clothing in the absence of 
such an objection. The trjal court in the instant matter 
properly refused the writ of habeas corpus since none of 
appellant's constitutional rights were violated by his 
trial in prison clothing. 
-9-
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POINT IV 
DENIAL OF I~BEAS CORPUS WAS 
PROPER SINCE APPELLANT WAS 
~FFORnRD C~l?ETE~T ASSISTANCE 
Appellant's brief, at pages 7-8, cites Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-64-1, 1953 as amended, and then asserts th0t 
"thA record revEals" a lack of effective counsel under 
the standards of that statute. Appellant also directs 
the court's attention to a portion of respondent's memorand~ 
of law to the lower court. The argument sought to be made 
is unclear, but it appears that appellant either wishes 
this court to search the trial record for instances of 
attorney misconduct or that appellant contends the lower 
court applied the wrong standard in finding that appellant 
was 2dequately represented at his first trial. 
If appellant contends the former, that the 
evidence at his hearing was simply insufficient to support 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of Judge 
Sawaya in denying habeas corpus, appellant has failed to 
sustain his burden in this appeal. It is well settled, 
in this state, that on appeal the appellant has the burden 
of proof. As this court noted in R.C. Tolman Construction 
Co. Inc., v. Myton Water Association, Utah, 563 P.2d 780-782 
(1977): 
-10-
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it is appropriate to have 
in mind three basic rul~s of revie~ 
on appe;;l: that we indulge the findinas 
2.:1~1 j,:,t:. -:<1': o_c t').e t::._-i_:~::.. c- _ ~ _. 
a presumption of validity and correctness; 
revie~ the record in the light favorable 
to them; do not disturb them if they 
find substantial support in the 
evidence; and require plaintiff 
(appellant) to sustain the burden 
of showing error." 
See also First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, Utah, 
521 P.2d 563 (1974); Holman v. Sorenson, Ut,".h, 556 P.2d 
499 (1976); and Hall v. Blackham, 18 U.2d 164, 417 P.2d 
664 (1966). This is particularly true in a habeas corpus 
proceeding where the petitioner bears a specific statutory 
duty to outline, in detail, the instances which give rise 
to a claim of denial of constitutional rights. U.R.C.P. 
Rule 65 B(i) (2). Judge Sawaya heard testimony from both 
appellant and his original trial counsel, Mr. Bryce Bryner. 
(R. at 15). Presumably, he also examined the trial record. 
Appellant has given no reason to doubt the conclusions of 
Judge Sawaya as trier-of-fact in the instant matter. 
Accordingly, his decision to deny habeas corpus should be 
affirmed. 
Nevertheless, appellant might be arguing that 
Judge Sawaya applied the wrong standard in determining 
that appellant was afforded adequate representation of 
counsel in his previous trial (R. at 20). 
-11-
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Ini ti.ally, it should bP notc:d thctt L't<th Co !r:; i\nn. 
§ 77-64-1, 1953 as amended, was en~cted by the legislature 
court which have made clc3r the pro~er standard to be:; 
applied in determining adequacy of coun~el. Although 
the statute may be slightly more explicite than the ca~e 
law, it is not inconsistent with the holdings of this court. 
The provisions of Utah Co<le Ann. 5 77-64-1, surra, are that 
the counties shall: 
"(1) Provide counsel for every 
indigent person unable to employ counsel 
who face~ the possibility of the 
deprivation of his liberty or other 
serious criminal sanction. 
(2) Afford representation which is 
experienced, competent, and zealous. 
(3) Provide the investigatory and 
other facilities necessary for a complete 
defense. 
(4) Come into operation at a 
sufficiently early stage of the 
proceeding so as to fully advise and 
protect the defendant. 
(5) Assure undivided loyalty of 
defense counsel to the client. 
{6) Include the taking of appeals 
and the prosecuting of other remedies, 
before or after a conviction, considered 
by the defending counsel to be in the 
interest of justice. 
-12-
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(7) Enlist community participation 
and responsibility and encourage the 
C0!1tJ !1l1lDCJ CO-O':Jt?-Latior. o: ~hc:- 0":.""-
(__j.._cni Lt~j lJ.J.J_-." 
For convenient analysis, the subsections can be considered 
as (a) those affecting defendants at trial or other 
hearings, subsections l, 2, and 5; and, (b) those which 
relate more to adequate assistance outside of a courtroom, 
subsections 3, 4, and 6. Subsection 7 acpears to be a 
general requirement not applicable to specific cases. 
It is clear that appellant has been represented 
by counsel in every proceeding, except in the instant 
matter, thus satisfying the requirerrents of subsection 
1. Subsections 2 and 5 do not add or go beyond the standard 
declared by this Court in Anderson v. Turner, 27 U.2d 182, 
493 P. 2d 1278 (1972): 
"The accused is entitled to the 
assistance of a competent member of 
the Bar, who shows a willingness to 
identify with the i-nterests of the 
defendant and present such uefenses 
that are available to him under the 
law and consistent with the ethics 
of the profession." (Id. at 1279). 
The statute states that counsel must be "experienced," 
Anderson does not, although that could be fairly implied. 
At any event, Judge Sawaya specifically found that appellant's 
counsel was experienced (R. at 19), thus r.:.eeting the wording 
-13·-
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of the statute. 
loyalty, and zealous defense. Anderson requires counsel 
,, l . 
~ -_.d , 
and presents such defenses as are ethically available 
under the law. Clearly, there are not t\'10 conflicting 
standards for trial representations in the statute and case 
law. The two sources, rather, simply state congruent 
requirements which were applied in the instant case. 
There is no indication that appellant was 
inadequately represented under the out-of-court sections (3,4, 
and 6) of Utah Code Ann. § 77-64-1, supra, either, It is 
apparent that appellant's counsel was involved and carryingon 
an investigation well in advance of trial. (Note appellant's 
indication that he, presumably through counsel, complied 
with the notice of alibi rule, appellant's brief p. 3). 
Although no appeal of appellant's conviction was under-
taken, there is no reason to assume that appellant was 
unable to do so through lack of counsel. 
The lower court's denial of habeas corpus should 
be affirmed since appellant has failed to sustain his 
burden of showing error in the lower court's conclusion or 
that the lower court failed to apply the proper standard 
of la·,l. 
-14-
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was properly denied since all of his claims could have 
been raised via timely appeal, but were not. Nevertheless, 
even if appellant's claims should be considered on the 
merits, the decision of the lower court in denying the 
writ should be affirmed. Appellant's constitutional 
rights were not violated by allowing the state to present 
newly discovered rebuttal witnesses. Neither were his 
rights offended by a trial in prison clothing. He was 
represented by an experienced, competent member of the bar 
and has failed to show in what respect the lower court 
erred in finding that he was not denied adequate assistance 
of counsel. 
Respondent therefore prays that the decision of 
the lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
\'iiLLV .. a l'l. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-15-
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